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K ara M - Karadeniz AraÅŸtÄ±rmalarÄ± Merkezi

KARADENİZ ARAŞTIRMALARI

BALKAN, KAFKAS, DOĞU AVRUPA VE ANADOLU İNCELEMELERİ DERGİSİ

K a r a M

KIŞ 2011 · Sayı 28

DANIŞMA KURULU / ADVISORY BOARD *

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Karadeniz Araştırmaları

Journal of theBlack SeaStudies

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Cilt/Volume 7 Sayı/Number 28Kış/Winter

2011 ISSN 1304‐6918

Sahibi ve Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü

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Academy of. Sciences, Kiev)

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(Bar‐IlanUniversity)

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İçindekiler / Contents

1 TurkishForeignPolicytowardtheBosnianWar

(1992‐1995): A Constructivist Analysis

Türkiye ve Bosna Savaşı (19921995): İnşaci

Kuram Çerçevesinde Bir Analiz

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

19 The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in

Europe’sSouthernGasCorridor

Avrupa’nın Güney Gaz Koridorunda AGRI’nin

Stratejik Ayrıcalığı

LászlóMarácz

29 ХодИсторииВспятьНеОбратить

Tarihin Akışı Geri Döndürülemez

Константин Думаа

51 XVI. Yüzyıl Anadolusunda Dış Göçler: Şarkiyan

Migration in the 16th Century Anatolia:

Şarkiyan

Alpaslan Demir

67 XVII. Yüzyıl Macar Millet Anlayışının İdeolojik

İçeriği Açısından Bir Örnek: Kuruz Hareketi Ve

Askeri Potansiyeli

An Example for the Ideological Contents of the

Hungarian National Idea in the 17thCentury

Was the Kuruc Movement and Its Military Force

Hüseyin Şevket Çağatay Çapraz

85 Mazlumların Kuramcısı ve Stratejisti: Sultan

Galiyev

Theorist and Strategist of Underdogs: Sultan

Galiyev

Demirhan Fahri Erdem

115 Yusuf Ziya Yozgadî ve Temaşâ‐yı Celâl‐i Hüdâ

Adlı Eseri

Yusuf Ziya Yozgadîand His WorkTemaşâyi

Celâli Hüdâ

Yunus Özger

151 Sıkıntı Kavramı ve Bir Küçük Burjuvanın Gençlik

Yılları Romanı

Concept of BoredomandtheNovelYoungDays of a

LittleBourgeois

Oğuz Öcal

Kitap Değerlendirme / BookReviews

165 Robert Dankoff: Seyyahı Âlem Evliyâ Çelebi’nin

Dünyaya Bakışı

Yahya Kemal Taştan

177 Karadeniz Araştırmaları Dergisi 7. Cilt Dizini

Index of the Volume VII of "Karadeniz Araştırmaları"

181 Yayın İlkeleri

EditorialPrinciples

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE BOSNIAN

WAR (1992-‐1995): A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun *

Özet

Bu çalışmada Türkiye'deki karar alıcıların Bosna Savaşı'na yönelik

izledikleri dış politika analiz edilmektedir. Araştırma sorusu Türkiye'nin o

dönemdeki mevcut iç ve dış sorunlarına karşın nasıl olup da aktif bir politika

izleyebildiğidir. Bu çalışma yeni bir devlet kimliği arayışı sürecinin bu

politikada etkili olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Bosna, Balkanlar, dış politika, devlet kimliği

Abstract

The main aim of this essay is to examine the policy adopted by Turkish

decision makers toward the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995. The

puzzling question is that why Turkey attempted to play an active role during

the war in Bosnia in spite of its internal and external problems at the time. This

study argues that the search for a new state identity in the post-‐Cold War era

provided the key to understand Turkish foreign policy towards the Bosnian

conflict. It is argued that by developing an active attitude toward the conflict,

Ankara was in fact trying to reformulate its former identity, which had been

constructed during the Cold War. Turkey was trying to prove that it was still

important for Western security in the new era. The study shows that the wars

of Yugoslav dissolution witnessed many speeches of Turkish leaders declaring

the greatness of the country. This dominant discourse was accompanied by an

active foreign policy by the Turkish leaders. At the time Ankara started many

diplomatic initiatives to bring the Bosnian issue to the attention of the

international community. This study argues that the discourse and foreign

policy during the Bosnian War were caused by Turkish leaders’ desire to show

Turkey’s still lasting geopolitical signifance to the world.

INTRODUCTION

Keywords: Turkey,, Bosnia, Balkans, foreign policy, state identity.

This article examines the policy adopted by Turkish decision makers

toward the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995. The puzzling question is

why Turkey attempted to play an active role during the war in Bosnia in

spite of its internal and external problems? This study argues that the

search for a new state identity by the policy makers provides the key to

* Doç. Dr., Başkent Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Eskişehir Yolu

20. km. Bağlıca 06810 Ankara. [email protected].

Karadeniz Araştırmaları • Kış 2011 • Sayı 28 • 1-‐18

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

understanding Turkish foreign policy toward the problems in former

Yugoslavia. It is argued that by developing an active attitude toward the

conflict, Ankara was in fact trying to reformulate its former identity, which

had been constructed during the Cold War. Turkey was trying to prove that

it was still important for Western security in the new era. It was trying to

project its new identity as a regional power, but it wanted to maintain its

Western-‐oriented foreign policy as well. Its active policy in the Balkans can

be attributed to its search for a reformulation of its former identity in

accordance with new international circumstances.

The article will, first, look at the position of Turkey in the new

conditions of international politics in the post-‐Cold War era. Second it will

examine the theoretical approach that is believed to be useful to

understand its foreign policy toward the Bosnian case. Third it will consider

Ankara’s approach toward the outbreak of the violence in Yugoslav

territories, mainly in Slovenia and Croatia. Fourth its attitude during the

Bosnian War that was the longest lasting and the bloodiest conflict in

Europe after the Second World War will be analysed. Fifth and last the main

findings of the research will be summarized.

TURKEY IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The collapse of the Cold War led to a new perception of Turkey in the West;

Turkey, which had considered herself an inseparable part of the West

during the Cold War, found itself in the position of an “awkward partner”. 1

The basic question was what kind of role Turkey would play in the new

conditions of global politics. Would Turkey continue to be a part of the

Western alliance or turn its face to the newly independent Turkic republics?

However the Gulf crisis which erupted in 1990 and resulted in US-‐led war

against Iraq changed the US perception of Turkey. 2 Due to the irredentist

policy of Saddam Hussein Washington realized that Turkey’s regional role

was still important for US national interests in the Middle East. The book

entitled Turkey’s New Geopolitics from the Balkans to Western China 3

published by the RAND Corporation, one of the most influential think tanks

in the US, emphasized increasing role of Turkey. It was argued that Turkey

1 Erik Cornell, Turkey in the 21st Century, Opportunities, Challenges, Threats (Britain: Curzon,

2001), p. 3.

2 For a discussion of the effect of the Gulf War on the US perception of Turkey please see

Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ‘Dünya ve Türkiye’, in F. Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi

(İstanbul: Der, 2004), p. 997.

3 Graham E. Fuller et. al., Turkey’s New Geopolitics from the Balkans to Western China (Boulder:

Westview Press, 1993).

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

become a regional power and the changes ensuing from the dissolution of

the Soviet Union made Turkey a critical power. 4

Philip Robins, meanwhile, maintained that Turkey’s strategic role in

the new era decreased and increased at the same time. Though it lost the

role that it had played during the Cold War, it became a regional player in

the 1990s by pursuing an active foreign policy in its neighborhood. 5 Robins

argued that the US recognized the increasing importance of Turkey

whereas Europe did not. It was also becoming clear that Turkey did not

share the euphoria of Western countries about the Soviet dissolution.

Turkey had difficulty adapting itself to the new norms on issues like human

rights increasingly emphasized by the West.

Another argument with regard to Turkey’s position in the new

international system was concerned with whether Turkey was a security

producing country or security consuming country. 6 Especially the member

states of the European Union were of the opinion that Turkey was mostly a

security consuming country leading to the commonly held belief that it did

not deserve to be taken into the Union.

In sum, while some observers maintained that Turkey became an

important regional power in the new era by allying itself with the US, the

sole superpower in the post-‐Cold War period, others suggested that

Turkey’s global position was harmed by the end of the perceived Soviet

threat. A main hypothesis of this study is that the new status of Turkey in

world politics is rather different from its former role. Because Turkey was

no longer a neighbor to one of the superpowers, the geostrategic

importance of Turkey changed. This could best be observed in the changing

Turkish perception of the European Union that concentrated all its energy

in enlarging toward the Central and East European countries but excluding

Turkey.

Further, the transformation of external global dynamics was coupled

with internal crises in Turkey as two important problems emerged which

challenged the state identity of Turkey: Kurdish nationalism and religious

fundamentalism. The PKK began its violent attacks in southeastern Turkey

in 1984. Following the Gulf War, it also benefited from the authority

vacuum in northern Iraq. After 1990, it increased its attacks against Turkish

security officials, as well as Kurdish civilians who were accused of being “on

the side of the Turkish state”. The first half of the 1990s saw the peak of

PKK activities. During the same period the state identity of Turkey was

4 For another evaluation of Turkey’s regional power role please see I. O. Lesser, ‘Turkey’s

Strategic Options’, The International Spectator, Vol. 34 (1999), p. 87.

5 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 12.

6 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-‐Avrupa

Birliği İlişkileri’, Doğu Batı, Vol. 4 (2001), p. 161.

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

challenged by another trend as well: religious fundamentalism

characterized especially by an increasing number of votes for the Welfare

Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Political Islam has been

one of the main concerns of the Turkish political elite since the foundation

of the Republic in 1923. The fact that the Welfare Party increased its share

of votes at every election since 1984 local elections led to increasing

apprehension 7 and the issue of political Islam (irtica) became more acute.

In that context, it was not surprising that in the National Political Document

of 1992 increasing political Islam was evaluated as “a serious danger” since

it was seen as a threat to the secular system of the country 8 In brief, it was

not only external challenges that Turkey had to face, but also serious

internal problems, like Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As states interact with each other they gain an identity for themselves and

also attach an identity to the others. Certainly the international aspect of

state identity is only one part of the whole picture: there are also domestic

factors defining what kind of entity a state would become. When one

compares the relative weight of domestic and international factors for

determination of state identity, for Wendt, state identity is to a great extent

established by the international system. 9 But the important thing at this

point is the significance of the concept of “state identity” for international

politics. First a definition of the concept is needed: state identity consists of

“a set of beliefs about nature and purpose of state expressed in public

articulations of state actions and ideals”. 10 It is basically about the definition

of a state’s rights, obligations and responsibilities and also of the meaning

attributed to other actors. In a way it is about setting boundaries between

oneself and others: 11 Who are you relative to others? And who are they

relative to yourself and themselves?

States have in fact two kinds of identities: internal and external. While

internal identity refers to the set of understandings within the boundaries

7 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, The Challenge to Europe and the United States

(Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 2000), p. 55; İhsan D. Dağı, ‘Transformation of Islamic Political

Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and the Westernization’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6

(2005), p. 25.

8 Gencer Özcan, ‘Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının

Artan Etkisi’, in G. Özcan and Ş. Kut (eds.), En Uzun On Yıl, Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış

Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (İstanbul: Büke, 2000), p. 76.

9 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1999), p. 20-‐21.

10 Marc Lynch, ‘Abandoning Iraq: Jordan’s Alliances and the Politics of State Identity’, Security

Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter 1998-‐1999, Spring 1999), p. 349.

11 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Introduction: Tracing the Influence

of Identity on Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter 1998-‐1999, Spring 1999), p. VIII.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

of that state among its constituent parts, external identity stands for a

state’s place among others in international politics. 12 The former can also

be labelled as national identity. It is the latter concept that will basically be

used in this study. Therefore, whenever state identity is mentioned, what is

in fact meant is the external identity. There is an important relationship

between state identity and foreign policy: 13 one of the significant ways for

states to acquire a new identity or protect the previous one is through

foreign policy. Their interactions with other states are a way of getting

themselves accepted as part of a certain international community and being

respected. Especially during the process of identity formulation or

reformulation, foreign policy is a key instrument for decision makers to

realize their goals. The constructivist approach is therefore expected to

have more explaining power during the periods of new identity creation. 14

The Turkish state played the primary role in the articulation of its

interests and formulation of foreign policy during the Balkan wars of the

1990s. In order to understand what kind of goals it pursued, we first have

to look at its state identity, i.e. how the political leadership perceived rights,

obligations and responsibilities of its own country and other countries in

world politics? In the case of Turkey, political leaders since Atatürk have

seen Turkey’s place as in the Western world. Atatürk’s radical reforms were

all based on the Western model. The foreign policy of modern Turkey can

be understood as a process of developing ever increasing and closer

relations with the West and as an attempt to be recognized as part of them.

Turkey was also a member of the Western bloc during the bipolar era and

contributed to the defence of the West against the perceived threat from the

Soviet Union.

Since the wars in the former Yugoslav territories occurred at the very

time when Turkish state identity was questioned, constructivism can be

used as a theoretical framework in order to understand whether it would

provide us with a better tool to make sense of Turkish foreign policy.

During this formative or reformative period, Turkey was expected to use its

foreign policy to perpetuate the external identities that it had acquired

during the bipolar world order.

How can one analyse whether the identity of Turkey played an

important role in its foreign policy? As constructivist theory argues, this can

be best demonstrated during the formative or reformative period of that

particular identity. Since the 1990s brought intense identity challenges to

12 Paul A. Kowert, ‘National Identity: Inside and Out’, Security Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter 1998-‐

1999, Spring 1999), p. 4.

13 David Campbell, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 76.

14 J. T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, Vol.

50 (1998), p. 346.

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

Ankara, our case study provides us with an important test for constructivist

theory. In order to decide whether state identity was effective in

formulating foreign policy, we should examine the following questions: Was

there any particular kind of identity that policy makers repeatedly stressed

upon in explaining their country’s place in the world? Was the foreign

policy behavior in accordance with the discourse that was emphasized? Did

the attitude comply with the state identity? Did any behaviour or discourse

in opposition to the claimed state identity lead to criticism within state? 15 If

it can be observed that there has been a dominant discourse on a certain

state identity, that Turkey acted in compliance with it, and that any

incompliance was faced with criticism, then we can argue for the validity of

constructivist thought in our case study.

TURKEY AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA

In fact the emerging conflict in Bosnia did not seem to have a direct impact

upon Turkish security considerations in the short or medium term.

Geographically, Bosnia was not in the close neighborhood of Turkey and

despite all speculations that war in the Balkans would lead to a Turkish-‐

Greek war, in a realistic perspective, it did not seem probable that the

conflict would spread to Turkey in the foreseeable future. Philip Robins

argues that in fact it was because of identity and “soft politics” that Turkey

became interested in Bosnia 16 In that context, it can be stated that Turkish

decision makers did not want the conflict in Bosnia to be perceived as a war

between Islam and Christianity. They were also concerned that if the

conflict last too long, Turkish public opinions’ view about Europe can

increasingly be negative. Moreover, the possibility of a new migration flow

to Turkey created apprehension on the part of the policy makers. In other

words, Turkey was interested in the Bosnian conflict not necessariy

because of “hard security” issues, but mostly because of “soft security”

issues including identity and migration.

One of the international platforms that Turkey considered as

important to bring the suffering of the Bosnians to the agenda was the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A common approach among

the countries whose populations consist mostly of Muslims toward the

Bosnian problem would attract the attention of international organizations

like the UN and get them to take more assertive actions. When the Bosnian

war started, Turkey was the term president of the OIC. Thus, it used this

opportunity to call an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers in

15 Thomas Banchoff, ‘German Identity and European Integration’, European Journal of

International Relations, Vol. 5 (1999), p. 277.

16 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp. 344-‐345.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

İstanbul. The meeting of foreign ministers from 15 OIC member countries

was held in İstanbul on 17-‐18 June 1992 in which the UN was called on to

take all necessary measures, including military, against Serbs. That was in

fact the position Turkey was already supporting. The Turkish initiative of

convening an extraordinary meeting of the OIC was important because it

transmitted to the world how the countries with Muslim populations

perceived the Bosnian war. Via that meeting, the OIC gained an important

function and could, hence, revitalize its role after a long period. 17

Turkey launched another initiative on Bosnia in August 1992 that

included both diplomatic and military measures. Turkey presented the

“Action Plan” to the permanent representatives of the UNSC and asked them

to implement the measures. The diplomatic part of the plan consisted of the

following proposals: a) Serbian militants should give up their weapons and

hand over their heavy weaponry to the UN personnel within 48 hours. b)

UN officials should be given the right to enter Serbian prisons and take

control over them. c) The UNSC should request Serbia to stop giving aid to

Serbian militias. d) Serbian militias guilty of committing massacres should

be tried in international courts.

The second part of the plan comprised military precautions in which

Turkey proposed to the UNSC members that if the diplomatic measures

were not accepted by the Serbian side or if the measures failed to achieve

the planned aims, then selected Serbian military targets should be bombed

from the air. Foreign Minister Çetin emphasized that the most important

part of the Action Plan was its military part: If other measures did not stop

the Serbian aggression, then a military intervention would be conducted.

Turkey’s Action Plan was one of the most important proposals for putting

an end to the violence in Bosnia in the early phase of the war. 18

From the end of May 1992 onward, Turkey adopted a new attitude

concerning any military intervention in Bosnia. Since there was no sign of

ending the war or reducing its extent, and since the international

community did not show a definite will to deter the aggressor either,

Turkey decided to back an international military operation against Serbian

targets. The intervention should take place within the framework of an

international organization, most probably the UNSC. However, the

government in Ankara emphasized its opposition to any unilateral move

that would not solve the problem. In this way the government distanced

itself clearly from Özal’s attitude.

In the meantime, Turkey was supporting the diplomatic initiatives of

the EC to provide a peaceful solution to the Bosnian conflict. Turkey was

17 Concerning İstanbul meeting of the OIC see Soysal and Kut, Dağılan Yugoslavya, p. 23

18 Şule Kut, ‘Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna-‐Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası:

1990-‐1993’, in Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, p. 330.

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

invited to the London Conference that was held on 26-‐27 August 1992.

Although Turkey was neither one of the parties to the conflict nor a

member of the EC, it was asked to take part in the conference. In Turkey the

invitation was considered as an important indication of its increasing

importance in the region, its active foreign policy, and its increasing

economic and political weight. It was also a result of the role Turkey played

in the framework of the OIC. In other words, as long as Turkey launched its

own initiatives and developed an assertive policy, it was gaining

importance in the European framework. Its improving status in Balkan

affairs and impact upon the regional actors and Islamic countries made

Europe understand how important and powerful Turkey was. On the other

hand, one should keep in mind that at the time when Turkey was trying to

deal with this heavy foreign policy agenda, it had to continue its struggle

against the PKK as well. Turkey, which tried to keep its security against

increasing PKK attacks and resurfacing Kurdish nationalism in its internal

politics, had to keep its attention on the violent conflict in the Balkans. In

spite of that, from the very beginning of the Bosnian War it tried to follow

an active foreign policy. One of the important reasons behind this assertive

foreign policy was the country’s aim to maintain its Western state identity.

Turkish decisionmakers firmly believed that Ankara was still important for

European security and it could prove its importance to the international

community through its policies during the Bosnian War. As Turkey took

new initiatives and supported heavy-‐handed measures, the West seemed to

understand that Ankara’s role was inevitable in the solution of the conflict

on the European continent. In other words, Turkey’s Western-‐oriented

state identity influenced its formulation of national interest and foreign

policy attitudes. Despite all its internal problems Turkey tried to propose

new initiatives for the solution of the conflict in order to maintain its former

identity.

Another important initiative of Turkey on the Bosnian issue was the

convening of a Balkan Conference in İstanbul on 25 November 1992. As the

violence was going on in Bosnia without any sign of reaching a ceasefire or

an agreement among the parties, there was the growing fear that the

conflict would spread to other regions in the Balkans, especially to Kosovo

and Macedonia. Çetin pointed out that there was a serious danger of the

outbreak of a Balkan war soon and that this was the greatest problem the

world was faced with. Turkey had two fundamental aims in gathering a

regional conference: a) to emphasize once again the necessity of military

intervention, b) to attract attention to the possibility of the war spreading.

The Turkish Foreign Minister emphasized that Turkey decided to take

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

initiative without waiting for the world to find a solution. 19 Regional

countries and some neighboring states took part in the conference:

Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and

Romania. The Balkan Conference could be considered as an important

diplomatic initiative of Turkey which aimed to get the international

community to act more assertively to stop the violent incidents in the

Balkans and prevent the beginning of a Balkan war. Turkey was both using

its contacts within the OIC and trying to play a regional leadership role in

order to assert more influence in the international arena.

When it became evident that the international actors did not intend to

conduct a military operation against Serbs in the short-‐term for a variety of

reasons, Turkish leaders decided to start a new initiative to stop the arms

embargo against Bosniaks. They argued that an embargo against the whole

Yugoslavia was in fact harming the Bosniak side since Serbia already had

enough stocks of weaponry and ammunition and was in a position to send

them to the Bosnian Serbs. Serbia could also break the embargo and get

new weapons from other countries. Turkey concentrated its efforts on the

US administration, Islamic countries, and international organizations to lift

the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. Foreign Minister Çetin

argued that the arms embargo led to a situation in which it became

impossible for the Bosniaks to defend themselves; thus the lifting of the

embargo was a moral necessity for the world. At the OIC Summit held in

Karachi in April 1993, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

and Malaysia put forward a joint proposal for lifting the embargo against

Bosnia-‐Hercegovina. The proposal was accepted unanimously at the

Summit, in which the OIC member countries called upon the UNSC to take

all necessary measures, including military ones, as soon as possible.

An important question in this regard is whether Turkey sent any

weapons to Bosnia violating the embargo. Accordimg to Turkish press

reports when Turkish journalists asked Foreign Minister Çetin whether

there would be any weapons transfer from Turkey, the Minister remained

silent. However, the former Turkish Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş made public

in late 1994 that during his term there were secret weapons deliveries to

Bosnia. However 90 % of these weapons were seized by Croatia. 20

Remembering that Turkey traditionally tries to maintain its cautious

attitude toward any regional conflict, one should state that sending

weapons to the Bosniak side was a good example of how Turkey deviated

from its traditional foreign policy.

19 The original text of Hikmet Çetin’s statement is the following: “Türkiye dünyadan medet

ummadan inisiyatif almaya karar vermiştir.” Quoted in Selin Çağlayan, ‘Ankara’nın kâbusu:

Balkan Savaşı…’, Hürriyet, 23 November 1992.

20 ‘Bosna’ya silah gönderdik’, Hürriyet, 4 December 1994.

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

As the violence between Bosniaks and Croats started in 1993, Turkey

proved itself to be one of the few countries in which both warring sides had

trust. Turkish mediation between the two sides was welcomed. 21 and even

both Bosniak and Croatian leadership asked for it. In their press meeting

Bosniaks and Croats pointed out that whenever their negotiations were

stuck, they applied to the mediation of Foreign Minister Çetin, and only with

his initiatives could the bilateral talks go on. Both sides expressed their

appreciation of Turkey’s role. Çetin also visited Sarajevo twice in order to

attend the Bosniak-‐Croat negotiations. By maintaining contact and friendly

relations with the Croat side as well, Turkey might also have attempted to

distance itself from the image of protectors of only the Muslims.

Turkey’s relations with the Bosnian Croat side and the Croatian

leadership were also one of the highlights of the visit of Turkish Prime

Minister Tansu Çiller and her Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Butto, to

Sarajevo and Zagreb in February 1994. The two leaders’ visit to Bosnia-‐

Hercegovina was important in several respects. It was the first high level

visit after that of French President Francois Mitterrand. Moreover, as

Western-‐oriented female leaders, their visit attracted the attention of the

world media, thus increasing the international public awareness of the

suffering in the region. Çiller and Butto made public the Declaration of

Sarajevo, in which they stated the aim of their visit as “humanitarian”, urged

the whole world to help stop the destruction of Bosnia, and requested the

UNSC to implement all its resolutions. They also pointed out that the

“unfair” weapons embargo should be ended. In Zagreb, Çiller met Croatian

leader Tudjman, who asked her to host a summit between Croats and

Bosniaks and convince Izetbegociv to attend. This was also a sign of how

Croatia perceived Turkey as a bridge to get into contact with the Bosniak

leadership.

As a result of its mediating role between Bosnian Croats and

Bosniaks Turkey’s contribution to the agreement on a ceasefire in February

1994 and creation of a federation between them the following month could

not be rejected. Turkey proved itself one of the peace brokers together with

the Washington administration which also appreciated Turkey’s role by

inviting it to the ceremony of the signing of the federation agreement.

Invitation of Turkey could be considered as an indication of its weight in the

region and how its role acquired importance during the Bosnian conflict. It

also showed that the Western world was aware of Turkey’s position

regarding the developments and the international community saw Turkey

within “the Balkan equation”.

21 İlhan Uzgel, ‘Doksanlarda Türkiye İçin Bir İşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Olarak Balkanlar’, in

Gencer Özcan & Şule Kut, eds., En Uzun On Yıl (İstanbul: Boyut, 1998), p. 410-‐411.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

Moreover, it was not just the regional actors, but also the international

actors that were seeking Turkish support in their attempt to find a peaceful

solution. Lord Owen, a UN representative, and Thorwald Stoltenberg, who

replaced Vance in May 1993 as EC mediator, paid an official visit to Turkey

and asked Turkey to use its influence over the Bosniaks. Owen stated that

the demands of Bosniaks for an outlet to the sea and more territory were

right in essence, however for a stable peace the parties should come to an

agreement. Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin stated that Turkey did not play a

concrete mediation role; however, he would contact Izetbegovic as soon as

possible to provide peace. He also added that Turkey would support

Izetbegovic’s policy to the end.

While trying to convince the international community to act more

forcefully, Turkey also made sure that it was ready to take part in all

military operations to provide peace and order in Bosnia. The UNSC

accepted Resolution 816 allowing NATO planes to attack Serbian war

planes that would try to violate the no-‐fly zone, and NATO aircraft began to

implement the decision on April 12, 1993. As a response, Turkey expressed

its readiness to join the NATO action. After NATO’s invitation, 18 Turkish F-‐

16 planes were sent to the region to monitor the no-‐fly zone. NATO’s

request for Turkey to send its aircraft was considered “a great success of

Ankara” and “a great source of prestige” in the Turkish press.

Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin, who played a critical role in the

formulation of Turkey’s Bosnian policy, resigned in July 1994. During his

term he supported an active but multilateral policy toward the Bosnian

dispute and did not pay any credit to those who were asking for unilateral

military action from Turkey. Before leaving his job he stated the following:

“Turkey was suddenly faced with many problems that all needed Turkey’s

attention. Thanks to Turkey’s initiatives in several issues it was understood

that Turkey was a great state whose opinions were respected.” On Bosnia

he stated:

Turkey did everything that was needed. I myself went to Sarajevo

four times under fire. We sent a huge amount of humanitarian aid.

Before the problem intensified, we launched an action plan in August

1992. If that plan had been implemented, the problem would not have

come to the point today. Although everybody stated that it was

impossible, Turkey sent peacekeeping soldiers. 22

Çetin’s remarks pointed out that in the post-‐Cold War era Turkey tried

to find policies to the problems in its neighborhood. He also stressed that

thanks to its initiatives, the international actors appreciated Turkey and its

greatness. The statements of the Turkish Foreign Minister could be

22 Barçın Yinanç, ‘Hiçbirşeyi daha kötü bırakmadım’, Milliyet, 30 July 1994. (Translated from

Turkish by the author)

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

regarded as a reaction to the claims that Turkey lost its former strategic

importance. Therefore, Turkish attempts to provide solutions to the

conflicts could be considered as a way of proving Turkey’s importance in

the new era.

In order to increase its support among both Turkish decision makers

and the public, Bosniak leadership tried to emphasize their similarities with

Turkey and the Turkish people. When Demirel wanted to visit Sarajevo in

July 1994, for his stay Bosniaks prepared the house of an Ottoman Pasha,

Topal Recep Pasha, who had served during the reign of Kanuni Sultan

Süleyman. By that gesture, the common history between Turks and

Bosniaks was emphasized and the Ottoman heritage in Bosnia was

remembered. Furthermore, Bosniak leaders were trying to find similarities

between their struggle and the Turkish War of Independence, thus

attempting to get more support from Turkey. The Bosnian Ambassador to

Turkey, Hayrettin Somun, pointed out that they would show the same

heroism as the Turks had already shown in their War of Independence and

win their independence by fighting.

From the beginning of August 1995 onward the US intensified its

efforts to find a solution to the Bosnian crisis. The Washington

administration looked for Turkish support, especially in convincing the

Bosnian side to agree to a peace deal. Since the US government was aware

of the fact that Ankara could exert its influence over the Bosnian leadership,

it sought Turkey’s help in that regard. The National Security Advisor to the

US President, Anthony Lake, visited Ankara and informed the Turkish

government about the new initiative of the US to find a solution to the

Bosnian debacle.

In September 1995 diplomatic traffic in Turkey concerning Bosnia was

intensified by the visits of the US Vice Foreign Minister Richard Holbrooke,

the Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Bosnian Foreign Minister

Muhammet Sakirbey. In the trilateral talks in Ankara, Holbrooke tried to

make use of Turkish mediation to encourage the Bosnian side to be more

flexible on the peace deal. Turkey repeated the importance of keeping

Bosnia-‐Hercegovina’s territorial integrity, which was also accepted by

Holbrooke. The US Vice Foreign Minister also stressed that any peace

implementation would need Turkey’s participation and Turkey played a

critical role in the Bosnian crisis. Lake’s and Holbrooke’s visits were an

important sign of Washington’s acknowledgement of Turkey’s role in the

Bosnian crisis. The US wanted to inform Turkey about a possible peace plan

and also to use its influence over the Bosnian leadership.

After a Serbian attack killed 37 people in a marketplace in Sarajevo,

NATO launched its biggest military campaign against the Bosnian Serb

forces, which was called Operation Deliberate Force. Although after the last

attack of the Bosnian Serb militants Çiller repeated Turkey’s willingness to

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

send troops to Bosnia in case the international community would launch a

joint operation, Turkish aircraft did not take part in the military campaign;

however, they provided air cover for the planes conducting the bombing.

Turkey was pleased that the Western world at last came to the conclusion

that the war in Bosnia could not be stopped without a military intervention.

That point was consistently repeated by Turkish decision makers since the

inception of the war. Turkish leaders declared that they supported the

decision to attack Serbian targets. Prime Minister Çiller stated that this was

simply “a good beginning” and declared her hope that “…this will establish a

good basis for discussing the international community’s peace plan and

take it in hand.” In addition, Foreign Minister İnönü pointed out that the

military campaign was “a step in the right direction by the international

community in fulfilling its undertakings to protect the civilian

population.” 23

The NATO operation was successful on the Serbian side and forced the

Serbians to come to the negotiating table. Serbian leader Milosevic, Bosnian

leader Izetbegovic and Croat leader Tudjman, as leaders of three groups,

started negotiations under the mediation of the US administration in

Dayton, Ohio on 1 November 1995. After two weeks they reached an

agreement on a peace deal stipulating maintenance of the territorial

integrity of Bosnia that would consist of a Bosnian-‐Croat federation and a

Bosnian Serb entity. Turkey did not play a direct role in the negotiations

which were, in fact, brokered by the US. After the conclusion of the

agreement, President Demirel congratulated all three leaders. Turkish

officials stated that the Dayton Peace Agreement was not a perfect one;

however, “under the prevailing circumstances this was the best that

historical opportunity provided.” 24

THE TURKISH PERCEPTION OF THE WAR AND STATE IDENTITY

In the Turkish view, what was happening in Bosnia was a reflection of the

Serbian leadership’s aim of creating ‘Greater Serbia’. Turkey was of the

opinion that Serbia was also trying to take revenge for the conquest of the

Ottomans of that region by killing Bosnian Muslims whom they also called

“Turks”. In fact, the Serbian leadership seemed to hate Bosniaks since they

regarded them as the extension of Ottoman history. The fact that Bosniaks

were, in fact, keeping Turkish culture alive increased that image in view of

the nationalist Serb groups. During the conflict Serbian and Croatian attacks

also damaged some of the buildings and infrastructure that had been

constructed during the Ottoman Empire. One of the best known examples

23 Semih D. İdiz, ‘Bosnia crisis reaches endgame’, Turkish Probe, 1 September 1995, p. 4.

24 Semih D. İdiz, ‘Ankara welcomes peace accord for Bosnia’, Turkish Probe, 24 November

1995, pp. 7-‐8.

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

was the destruction of the bridge in Mostar by the Bosnian Croat forces. In

other words, for Turkey, the war also represented the erasing of the

Ottoman culture in Europe. This was a war not only against Bosnian

Muslims, but also against all Ottoman heritage. 25

Turkish officials were also affected by the fact that Turkey was the only

country that Bosniaks could ask for help. Turkey was the only source of

help for them. Regardless of whether or not Turkey wanted it, they

considered Turkey as their only would-‐be guardian that should provide

protection for them. There was no other country to which they could turn.

The Turkish Foreign Minister stated:

During the Gulf War there were no people who waited for Turkey to

come to their help and who saw Turkey as the only hope for their salvation.

Events did not turn into a massacre. In Bosnia-‐Hercegovina people are

sacrificing everything in order to migrate to Turkey. That was not the case

in Iraq. In Bosnia-‐Hercegovina and Azerbaijan people had hope only from

Turkey. They had millions of relatives in Turkey. They were doing their best

to migrate to where those people were living. 26

Turkish foreign policy during the Bosnian War could be called active

and assertive, since Turkey launched many initiatives to get other countries

and international organizations to act. Turkish attempts were concentrated

on two sides: the Islamic world and the Western world. 27 Concerning

Islamic countries, Turkey used the platform of the OIC by trying to bring all

countries with Muslim populations to adopt the same attitude on the

Bosnian conflict. The extraordinary summit of the OIC in İstanbul in June

1992 was an important early initiative that led to the acceptance of a

common point on the issue. The convening of the Balkan Conference and

the diplomatic initiatives launched at the level of the CSCE, UN and NATO

calling upon them to decide in favour of a military intervention were also

significant activities of Turkey in its attempt to end the bloodshed. Turkey,

in fact, was the only country that from the early phase of the war

consistently insisted on the necessity of a military campaign against Serbian

targets. Ankara emphasized its opinion that only sanctions and diplomatic

measures would not be enough to deter Serbs. The Turkish government

also stated that it was ready to join an international intervention with its

own troops. Some observers even compared the role of Turkey in the

Bosnian crisis to that of the US during the Gulf conflict. In fact the use or

threat of force was not a traditional instrument in Turkish foreign policy.

25 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Ottoman heritage on Turkey’s policy toward

the Balkans please see Şaban H. Çalış, 2001. Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler, Neo-‐Osmanlılık,

Özal ve Balkanlar. Konya: Çizgi.

26 Nilüfer Yalçın, ‘Çetin: ‘Derhal uyacağız’ ’, Milliyet, 1 June 1992. (Translated from Turkish by

the author)

27 Hasan Ünal, ‘Bosnia II – a Turkish critique’, The World Today, Vol. 51 (1995), p. 128.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

Turkey has always been cautious toward the use of force except in some

rare circumstances. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy during the Bosnian

problem could be regarded as the most active one since the Cyprus issue in

1974. 28

At the time of the Bosnian conflict, Turkish policy makers declared

many times that Turkey was a great country that would follow a leading

and dynamic foreign policy. Since Turkey’s position in the new

international order of the post-‐Cold War era was discussed heavily at the

time, Turkish leaders were insisting on the country’s important role in

world politics. In their view, one should remind the world that Turkey was

still influential and could not just be put aside. In the region extending from

the Adriatic to the Wall of China, it was not possible to wage a war or bring

peace without the support of Turkey. 29

During the Bosnian conflict, thanks to its initiatives Turkey was taken

into consideration. Almost all the actors involved in some kind of

mediation asked for Turkey’s support. Owen-‐Stoltenberg’s visit to Ankara,

the invitation of Turkey to the London Conference, and later Richard

Holbrooke’s contacts in Ankara were important indications that so long as

Turkey launched an active diplomacy, its role in international politics was

appreciated. In other words, as Turkey’s role in regional affairs increased,

Turkey’s position in international politics improved as well.

Moreover, Turkey’s influence in the Balkans was perceived as an

important proof of its claim of being European. Only if it had weight in the

region, it could prove its importance to Europe. If its Bosnian policy failed, it

would mean not just the destruction of an Ottoman heritage, but also the

end of Turkey’s European dream.

The Kurdish question did not appear to play any substantial role in

Turkey’s Bosnian policy since Bosnia was an internationally recognized

country and the violence against it was directed mainly from another state,

Yugoslavia. Although Kurdish nationalism was on the rise in those years

and PKK attacks constituted a major internal problem, Turkey presented

inter-‐group relations in the country as a model to the Balkans. However, it

was also emphasized that if a multi-‐cultural and democratic Bosnia was

created, this would be an example for the solution of Turkey’s own

problem. Meanwhile, some observers stated that it was easier in Turkey to

go to Bosnia than to criticize Turkey’s Kurdish policy.

In sum, arguing that it was a great country interested in its region,

Ankara tried to play a leadership role and assume guardianship of the

Bosniaks. It launched many diplomatic initiatives, but it was careful not to

act alone. It was emphasized by Turkish decision makers many times that

28 Diplomats at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Interview by author, Ankara, January 2004.

29 A previous Turkish foreign minister, Interview by author, Ankara, 13 January 2004.

Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun

Turkey would act multilaterally and did not have any neo-‐Ottomanist

dreams. Turkey considered that as long as it could assert its weight in the

Balkan crisis, it would be taken into account by the US, European countries

and international organizations.

CONCLUSION

This study analyzed Turkey’s foreign policy during Bosnian War between

1992-‐1995. Turkish state identity has been discussed heavily in the wake of

the end of the Cold War and alternative identities were proposed instead

especially by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists. As the country’s strategic

role that it acquired during the Cold War was increasingly questioned, there

seemed to be ambiguity regarding the path that Turkish foreign policy

makers would choose. The war in Bosnia started at the very time in which

Turkey was experiencing an identity crisis.

The findings of this study supports the hypothesis that constructivist

approach helps us make sense of Turkey’s Bosnia policy. Turkey tried to

prove that it could still play an important role in its neighborhood,

especially in Europe in the new circumstamces of the post-‐bipolar world

system. Turkey’s Bosnian policy constituted a hallmark because it

represented the most active foreign policy attitude of Ankara since the

Cyprus intervention of 1974. Turkey found that as it acted rigorously and

tried to convince international actors to act more assertively, it was

increasingly taken into consideration by the great powers, like the US and

EU. The fact that it started bearing the fruits of its active policy encouraged

Turkey to maintain the intended course.

During the Bosnian war Turkish policymakers stressed the continuing

importance of Turkey for the stability of the neigboring regions. The wars

of Yugoslav dissolution witnessed many narratives of Turkish leaders

declaring the greatness of the country. This dominant narrative was

accompanied by an active foreign policy implemented by the Turkish

leaders characterized by Ankara’s many diplomatic initiatives to bring the

Bosnian issue to the attention of the international community and convince

international actors to take more measures in order to stop the conflict.

This study argued that this discourse and foreign policy were caused by

Turkish leaders’ desire to show Turkey’s still lasting geopolitical signifance

to the world. Related to that they also aimed to maintain the state identity

that Turkey had acquired during the Cold War as part of the Western world.

Turkish policy makers found that as long as they launched initiatives for the

solution of the conflict, they were taken more seriously by the US and other

international actors.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (1992-‐1995)

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THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF AGRI IN EUROPE’S

SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR

László Marácz *

Özet

Avrupa, enerji açısından neredeyse tamamen kıta dışındaki satıcılara

bağımlıdır. Son zamanlarda Avrupa Birliği (EU), çeşitli ülkelere enerji

bağımlığını azaltmayı başaramadı. Bu durum, Avrupa Birliğini dünya

arenasında jeopolitik bir oyuncu olarak oldukça savunmasız bırakmıştır.

Özellikle merkezî ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri doğalgazlarını Rusya'dan

sağladıkları için neredeyse tamamen onlara bağlımlıdır. Merkezi ve Avrupa

kıtasındaki bazı ülkeler bu durumunu değiştirmeye çalışmaktadırlar.

Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Romanya, 2010 Nisan ayında Rusya'yı atlayarak

Hazar Denizi yoluyla Karadeniz'den Avrupa'ya doğalgazı taşımak için

anlaştılar. Bu yıliçinde Macaristan da AGRI adlı konsorsiyuma katıldı. Sonuç

olarak, AB üye ülkeler, Rus kontrolündeki doğalgaz boru hatlarına daha az

bağımlı olacak.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Enerji çeşitliliği, AGRI, LNG, Karadeniz, Jeopolitik.

Abstract

Europe is almost completely dependent for her energy on outside suppliers. In

recent years the European Union (EU) has not succeeded in reducing the

energy dependencies by diversification, a keyword in European strategic

papers (see, COM 2008 781 final). This makes the European Union as a

geopolitical player in the world arena rather vulnerable. Especially the

countries in Central and Eastern Europe are almost completely dependent for

their gas supplies on Russia. Some countries in the Central and European space

are trying to modify this state of affairs. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania have

agreed upon in April of this year to transport gas from the Caspian Sea via the

Black Sea to Europe bypassing Russia. Later this year Hungary also has joined

this so-‐called AGRI consortium. As a result, EU-‐member states will be less

dependent on the gas pipelines that are carrying Russian gas through states

that are under Russian control.

Keywords: Energy diversification, AGRI, LNG, Black Sea, geopolitics

EU-‐RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN ENERGY POLITICS

Russia is intrinsically involved in the EU debate on energy security.

According to Richard Youngs, Russia ‘completely dominates (…) debates

over European energy policy (see Youngs 2009, 79).’ Russia is the main

* Assist. Prof. Dr., University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Humanities, European Studies,

University of Amsterdam, l.k.mara[email protected].

Karadeniz Araştırmaları • Kış 2011 • Sayı 28 • 19-‐28

László Marácz

actor engaged in the issue of supply. As one of the largest global suppliers of

natural gas and oil, Russia can meet high European demands for energy.

Due to its geographical proximity to the Union, the country’s energy giant,

the state-‐owned company Gazprom is also an obvious partner for European

state members’ energy providers. Russia on the other hand benefits from

these European revenues. One fifth of its annual GDP income is derived

from energy revenues (Godzimirski 2009). However, political unrest in the

post-‐Soviet space can endanger reliable supply to Europe, as has happened

several times in recent years. Having toppled the communist system only

two decades ago, Russia remains an unstable partner in energy negotiations

(Correlje and Van der linde 2006). In 1994 efforts to place Russia’s pipeline

network under multilateral regulations failed when Russia refused to ratify

the Energy Charter Treaty (Youngs 2009, 80). To prevent further upheavals

and ensure energy security, the EU established a Common Economic Space

(CES) with Russia at a summit in St. Petersburg in 2003. The long-‐term goal

of the agreement is the formation of an open market between EU and

Russia.

Europe’s demand for gas is high, however, and Russia can meet this

demand like no other actor on the market (Progress Report 2008). Europe

will not be able therefore to exclude Russia from gas deals. Maintaining

good relations with Russia is a prerogative. By creating a more formal

cooperation basis with Russia, EU can, however, avoid becoming a victim of

the sort of unpredictable reactions the Ukraine has had to put up with

regularly. Signed contracts can ensure EU energy safety and reasonable

prices for Russian gas. The Common Economic Space between EU and

Russia provides a framework to establish legally binding documents on gas

deals.

Energy related issues form the “backbone’’ of CES (see Sutela 2005,

14). Due to asymmetrical provisions in supply and demand between the

Union and Russia several gas disputes have had to be solved during the last

years (see Progess Report 2008). Russia has turned out to be a politically

unreliable partner in gas supply. Following political rows with

neighbouring states Russia has regularly turned off the gas tap thereby

hindering transit to Europe. During the Russian war with Georgia in 2008,

following price disputes with Ukraine in 2006 (Stern, 2006; Youngs 2009)

and as a reaction to failed debt payments by Ukraine in 2008 (Pirani et al.

2009), Russia demonstrated its power by causing severe gas shortages in

Central and Eastern Europe following the pipeline cuts. As a consequence,

EU and Russia agreed on an Early Warning Mechanism in 2009 to prevent

further crises leaving EU countries at the mercy of Russian gas magnates

(EU press release, 2009).

European energy security is highly dependent on diplomatic relations

with Russia and joint ventures between European and Russian energy

The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor

companies. The foremost objective of Union’s energy policy is to secure

supply. As a ‘net energy importer’ (COM 2008 781 final) Europe is exposed

to energy supply shocks, price volatility and decreasing fossil fuel reserves.

Indigenous energy production covers barely half of Europe’s need, with 56

percent of European energy imported from third countries. In fact,

domestic production even started declining in 2004 (COM 2008 781 final).

If this trend is not reversed, fuel imports will rise even further in the future.

Oil and gas, i.e. 60 and 26 percent in 2008 respectively, compromise the

largest share (COM 2008 781 final). Russia provided 36 percent of oil

imports in 2007 (Europe’s Energy Position, 2009, 21) and 42 percent of gas

import in 2008 (COM 2008 781 final), rendering the EU highly dependent

on Russian resources. Even if substantial increase in Russian energy

supplies is achieved until 2020 twenty percent ‘energy imports [are] set to

rise under almost all scenarios’ (COM 2008 781 final, 3).

THE GREAT PIPELINE RACE

The European Union has not succeeded in developing a common energy

strategy, nor a strategy of energy diversification. There is a lot of talking

about the EU’s sponsored Nabucco-‐pipeline that should carry gas from

Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region via the Caucasus and Turkey to

Europe thereby bypassing Russia and Ukraine but concrete steps to

construct the pipeline have not been taken so far. It is extremely unlikely

that the Nabucco project will be operative in 2015 as has been planned.

Without a common energy policy and a succesfull strategy of energy

diversification the EU will hardly become a major political player in the

21th century.

Europe is linked to the Russian gas fields by several large gas pipelines,

like the North Stream. More gas pipeline routes, like South Stream will be

planned in the near future and can be considered as a concurrent to the

Nabucco pipeline in the southern gas corridor. These pipelines and projects

are controlled or will be controlled by the Russians or will run through

countries, like Belarus or Ukraine that are politically controlled by Russia.

Also some richer countries in the Western part of Europe, like Germany

have reached an agreement with Russia on the supply of gas. Russian gas

will be carried by pipelines that run directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea,

the so-‐called North Stream. North Stream is cooperation between the state-‐

owned Russian company Gazprom, the German energy companies E.ON and

BASF and the Dutch Gasunie. Poland is excluded from this pipeline and the

Russian-‐German cooperation has been interpreted in Poland as a modern

Molotov-‐Ribbentrop Pact referring to the Sovjet-‐Nazi pact preceding the

Second World War that determined the tragic faith of Poland and the other

Central and Eastern European countries during and after the Second World

War.

László Marácz

In the past Russia has successfully played EU members off against the

others. The EU treats energy policy as a foreign policy issue, an area

member states like to protect from too much interference from Brussels

(Youngs 2009). By signing bilateral agreements with major national energy

providers such as German E.ON, Italian ENI and French EDF, Russian energy

giant Gazprom has managed to become a direct stakeholder in the largest

national gas markets in Europe (Leal-‐Arcas 2009). Other competeting non-‐

EU gas suppliers to the EU, such as Algeria and Libya that are active on the

Italian market, have been made business partners by the Russians in an

attempt to monopolize gas supply into the EU. The Lisbon Treaty added a

clausal on energy solidarity amongst the EU-‐members. The clausal has no

legal binding, however and is not being obeyed (Progress Report, 2008).

Companies like E.ON, ENI and EDF are therefore helping Russia along in

gaining a gas monopoly.

Hence, Russia has used its monopoly position as a real geopolitical

weapon that can be employed for ‘divide and rule’ tactics. Austria, Hungary

and Serbia could not resist the temptation and were willing to accept the

offer of Gazprom to buy shares in their local energy companies, i.e. Austrian

OMV, Hungarian MOL and Sebian NIS to bind them to the South Stream

project. Russian energy company Surgutneftegas has acquired 21.2 percent

stake in Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, although MOLs constitution

allows only for a foreign stake of 10 percent. This deal violating Hungarian

law was concluded by the pro-‐Russian, oligarchic government of Prime

Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany who was lobbying for the position of

‘commissioner of the South Stream project’ and made Hungary completely

dependent on Russian interest. Recently the new Hungarian centre-‐right

government under Viktor Orbán declared by his spokesman Tamás Fellegi,

Hungary’s National Development Minister that the state wants to increase

its leverage in the energy sector and does not welcome foreign stakeholders

in strategic national companies (See Politics.HU). It will be not easy to get

rid of the Russian stake in the MOL company, however. Gazprom was able

to buy the Serbian state energy company NIS for almost nothing and also

acquired the control of pipelines on Serbian territory giving the Serbs the

guarantee that South Stream will be running over Serbian territory. In the

end South Stream will reach Silvio Berlusconi’s Italy who is a frequent guest

in the Kremlin and a strong supporter of Russian exclusive energy interest

in Europe (see Lucas 2008).

In order to break the exclusive dependency on Russia gas that is not

only the gas itself but also the routes carrying the gas to the Union the EU

has launched several projects to diversify the routes. The best-‐known

pipeline project in the southern gas corridor is the already mentioned

Nabucco that will carry gas over the territory of Turkey. But several other

smaller projects, such as the Trans-‐Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the Turkey-‐

The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor

Greece-‐Italy Interconnector (ITGI) or the Azerbaijan-‐Georgia-‐Romania

Interconnector (AGRI) all have the potential to be an important element of

the southern gas corridor and even call into question the future of Nabucco

itself. In any case, all these pipelines will draw gas from the same gas fields,

i.e. Sah-‐Deniz 1-‐2 in the Caspian Sea region.

European pipeline project Nabucco has been undercut several times by

the Russians. Under Ference Gyurcsány’s pro-‐Russian government in 2007

Hungary signed a bilateral deal with Gazprom to receive gas via the Russian

pipeline Blue Stream (Youngs 2009). Due to this deal Hungary temporary

withdraw from EUs Nabucco pipeline project triggering criticism from

Brussels (see Aczél 2010). In 2010 Russia signed deals with Azerbaijan,

securing gas supplies to stream to Russia instead of through the delayed

Nabucco pipeline (Socor 2010).

Furthermore, Russian pipeline project South Stream will form a direct

rival supply route to Nabucco as it also carries gas to Southern Europe

(Finon 2010). With French EDF and Italian ENI financing the rival, it is hard

to take Europe seriously in its attempts at solidarity. South Stream will

bypassing Romania and cuts through Bulgaria playing off Romania and

Bulgaria against the other. This is one of the main reasons Romania has

been initiating AGRI bypassing Russia in order to guarantee itself a place

within the South Stream project.

RUSSIAN GAS MONOPOLY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

As mentioned above Russia has an important share in the energy supply of

the European Union. Especially the countries in Central and Eastern Europe

are almost completely dependent upon Russian gas. Slovakia is depending

for 99 percent, the Czech Republic for 78 percent, Hungary for 80 percent,

Poland for 67 percent and the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

for 100 percent on Russian gas. The only exception in Central and Eastern

Europe is Romania that satisfies 85 percent of her gas demands from

internal resources. Furthermore, in these countries the connecting

pipelines to Russia run over Ukrainian territory, i.e. in the case of Slovakia,

Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania

and Russia or Russian controlled countries like Belarus in the case of the

Baltic countries (compare Marácz 2009, 17).

The Russians are very well aware of this and have used the energy

weapon against those who are critical about present day Russia. The small

Baltic countries can be blackmailed by threatening to cut off energy

supplies from Russia. In recent winters Russia was not ready to deliver gas

to Ukraine of president Viktor Yushchenko who was conducting a pro-‐

Western policy. After the election in February 2010 of this year that was

won by the pro-‐Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine does not

László Marácz

have to be afraid that they will be cut off from Russian energy supplies. The

government of Yanukovych will support Russian politics led by Putin and

Medvedev in exchange for lower energy, especially gas prices that will keep

the Yanukovych government longer in power.

Gazprom, Russia’s state-‐owned sole exporter of Russian gas has not

only succeeded in attaining large shares of European energy firms it also

holds long-‐term supply contracts with European distributors (Dreyer

2010). In the cases of Slovakia and Bulgaria, where one distributor

dominates the entire market for gas (Stern 2005) consumers are 100

percent dependent on Russian supplies. The Baltic states are also highly

dependent on Russian gas with Gazprom holding a 37 percent stake in Eesti

Gaas (Stern 2005, 127), Estonia’s gas monopoly. These European bilateral

ventures with Russian state-‐owned gas company Gazprom undermine EU

attempts to speak with one voice and to take up seriously the issue of

energy diversification. As some EU-‐members rely on only one supplier, i.e.

the Baltic states on Russia securing supplies entails lowering dependency

on these suppliers by diversifying the sources. The Union’s strategy seems

to construct ‘reliable framework conditions’ to realize this diversification

(COM 2008 781 final, 5). Priority infrastructure projects aimed at

interlinking European energy markets and subsequently decreasing their

dependence on third countries is listed under this point. Projects include

the ‘Baltic Interconnection Plan’ which entails key infrastructures necessary

for effective interconnection of the Baltic region with the rest of the EU and

the ‘southern gas corridor’ interconnections to link gas supply from Caspian

and Middle eastern sources and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) develop LNG

action plan on liquefaction and storage facilities. One of these latter projects

is AGRI.

THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF AGRI

As we have discussed above especially the countries between Germany and

Russia in the Central and Eastern European zone are worried about their

energy supplies that is strongly connected to their security and safety. To

retake the initiative three presidents, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham

Aliyev, the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and the Romanian

President Trajan Basescu met in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku on 14 September

of this year and signed the Baku declaration in which the three heads of

state decided to construct a gas pipeline that will connect the three

countries. The construction of the pipeline labeled AGRI which is the

abbreviation of ‘Azerbaijan-‐Georgia-‐Romania-‐Interconnection’ will connect

these countries via the Black Sea. The Georgian president Saakashvili who

is clearly on the side of the West and would like his country to join NATO

has played a crucial role in setting up AGRI. With the help of the AGRI

The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor

project Saakashvili himself is using energy as a geopolitical weapon against

Russia trying to embarrass the Russians at their own playing field.

AGRI will draw gas from the Caspian Sea that will be carried via a

pipeline across land to Georgia for liquefaction. This process of liquefaction

will take place in a plant for LNG exports at the Azerbaijan-‐owned oil export

terminal of Kulevi in Georgia. Kulevi is by the way at “spitting distance”

from the breakaway autonomous territory Abkhazia. Abkhazia is a

marionette state of Russia and is providing Russia a stronger geopolitical

position in the southern part of the Caucasus to put pressure on the AGRI

project. Commentators are afraid that this will make the AGRI project

vulnerable indeed. Further transport of LNG will take place via tankers

from the Georgian port of Poti to the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta.

In Constanta a terminal will be constructed for the re-‐gasification of the

LNG. The gas will be pumped through Romanian’s pipeline system to

Hungary and to the rest of the Balkans and the European Union.

The Romanian President Traian Basescu has declared that the project

will be set in motion by all means but that he is hoping for financial support

from Brussels. An advantageous moment for this is the coming year 2011

because in the first half year Hungary will chair the Union and afterwards

Poland. The latter country is strongly supporting the Eastern Partnership to

establish all sorts of ties in the post-‐Soviet space having Georgia and

Azerbaijan among its members. Basescu is counting on support from

Hungary where recent elections in April 2010 have been won with a

landslide by the pro-‐Western, centre-‐right coalition led by Viktor Orbán.

This coalition took the government position of the Hungarian socialist party

MSZP, an ardent supporter of Gazprom policy. On September 20 Hungary

even announced it would become a shareholder in AGRI project. Now the

following state energy companies, i.e. Romanian Romgaz, Georgian Oil and

Gas Corporation (GOGC), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic and

the Hungarian Magyar Villamos Müvek Zrt. each holds a 25 percent stake in

the project. Interestingly the Hungarian government had to leave out the

MOL company because a Russian company has a stake in MOL, otherwise

the Russians would have entered the AGRI project through the backdoor.

AGRI will carry eight billion cubic metres gas a year (bcm/year) to

Europe. Compared to the planned 38 bcm/year of Nabucco this is a rather

modest figure. AGRIs capacity will be about five times less than Nabucco’s.

The figure is indeed rather modest when we take into account the yearly

LNG-‐import of a country like France that is about twice as much as the 8

bcm/year that is planned by AGRI. The project financing will require a

relatively modest amount of money of 4-‐6 billion euro. These figures can be

lifted quite easily as demands will increase, however. In speeding up the

distribution possibilities of AGRI to Central Europe and the Balkans the

interconnecting pipeline between Hungary and Romania has already been

László Marácz

constructed. On October 14 of this year the gas pipeline linking the

Romanian city of Arad and the Hungarian city of Szeged making the

distribution of AGRI gas to Central Europe possible has been opened. It is

also one of the first gas pipelines running ‘north-‐south’ in the Central and

Eastern European area. The opening was attended by European

commissioner for energy, Günther Oettinger who announced that pipelines

running ‘north-‐south’ on the territory of the Union, like the Arad-‐Szeged

pipe line and their connections to the north will be sponsored by the

European Commission. North-‐south pipelines play an important role in the

energy security of the Union.

EU-‐projects in the southern energy corridor are strengthened by a

decision of the European Commission to establish a Danube Region in order

to interconnect a geopolitical territorial unit, a European macro-‐region

through which the Danube river is flowing consisting of Germany, Austria,

the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, the

Republic of Moldova and Ukraine – six of which are EU Member States, and

in a broader territorial context the region also comprises the Czech

Republic, Slovenia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro. Concerning

Germany and Ukraine only the regions have been invited that are crossed

by the Danube, like the German federal states Baden-‐Württenberg and

Bavaria. By doing so it is prevented that Germany with its enormous

economic power would dominate the Danube strategy (European

KARADENİZ ARAŞTIRMALARI BALKAN, KAFKAS, DOĞU AVRUPA VE ANADOLU İNCELEMELERİ DERGİSİ K a r a M KIŞ 2011 · Sayı 28

Özet Osmanlı Devleti’nin, idari, sosyal ve ekonomik yapısı ile ilgili verileri kapsaması bakımından tahrir defterleri mevcut arşiv kaynakları içerisinde ayrı bir öneme sahiptir. Tahrir Defterleri ışığında Osmanlı Devleti’nin pek çok şehri sosyo‐ekonomik yapı bakımından incelenmiştir. Tahrir defterleri çerçevesinde Anadolu’nun çeşitli şehir ve sancaklarını çalışan araştırmacıların hem fikir olduğu konu 16. yüzyıl Anadolu’sunda bir nüfus artışı yaşandığıdır. Genel itibariyle araştırmacıların ekseriyeti, çalıştıkları bölgelerdeki nüfusun yüzyıl içerisinde iki katına çıktığını ifade etmekte ve aşırı bir nüfus artışından bahsetmektedir. Mevcut nüfus artışına karşın, Türkiye sınırları içinde kalan bölgeler için yapılmış olan tahrir çalışmalarında, demografik yapının açıklanması açısından çok önemli olan, Osmanlı/Anadolu dışından yada içinden gelen ve nüfus artışına katkı yapan göç konusu ya hiç incelenmemiş ya da istatistiklere yer verilmeden sadece bir iki paragraf bahsedilerek geçiştirilmiştir. Tahrir Defterlerinde mevcut dış göç verileri arasında şarkî, şarkiyân ya da şarklu şeklinde geçen kayıtlar dikkat çekmektedir. Tahrir Defterlerinde geçen şark kavramının ne olduğu münferit bir çalışma yapılmadığından dolayı tam olarak açıklığa kavuşturulamamıştır. Tahrir Defterleri ekseninde yapacağımız bu çalışmada, Orta ve Doğu Anadolu’da mevcut 50’den fazla şehir yada kasaba merkezine ait veriler çerçevesinde şark tabirinin ne anlam ifade ettiği ortaya konulmaya ve bu veriler dış göç bağlamında değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Tahrir Defterleri, 16. Yüzyıl, Göç, Safevi, Osmanlı. Abstract Tahrir Registers have an important place within the present archive sources as they include the information about governmental, economic and social structure of Ottoman Empire. In the light of tahrir registers, many cities of Ottoman Empire have been scrutinized. The issue about which researschers ,who work on various cities and counties, agree in the frame of Tahrir registers is that there appeared a population increase in the 16th century Anatolia. Generally, most of the researchers state that, in the places they worked in this century, the population increased twofold, and they mention about an excessive population increase. Despite this existing population increase , in the tahrir studies which were done for the areas within the borders of Turkey, the migration, which has an important place from the aspect of explaining the demographic structure, which is inside or outside of Ottoman/Anatolia and contributing the population increase, either has never been scrutinized, or have been procrastinated by mentioning about it just two paragraphs without showing any statistics. In the Tahrir registers, within the existing information about migration, the records such as şarki, şarkiyan or şarklu take attention. What the concept of şark is within the Tahrir registers has not been explained exactly since there isn’t any discrete study about it. In this study, which will be done in the frame of tahrir registers, what the term şark means will be tried to revealed in the light of information which more than fifty city or town centre existing in Middle and East Anatolia and this information will be evaluated in the context of migration. Key words: Tahrir Registers, 16th century, Migration, Safevi, Otoman.

Geleneksel Toplu Eğlencelerin Mekân Dönüşümü: Ankara Ferfeneleri ................................................

ÖZET Ömer Seyfettin, Türk hikâyeciliğin en önemli isimlerinden birisidir. Olayların yaşandığı dönemle ilgili bize çeşitli ipuçları veren Maupassand tarzındaki kısa, yer yer mizahi hikâyeleri; sade bir Türkçe ile yazıldığı için günümüze kadar çok okunagelmiş ve klasikleşmiştir. Bazı öykülerinde kendi çocukluk anılarına yer vermesi, bazılarında da çocuk kahramanları anlatması; onun bir çocuk edebiyatçısı olarak algılanmasına neden olsa da yaşadığı 36 yıllık kısa ömründe, yazarın çocuk edebiyatçısı olma gibi bir amacı olmamıştır. Bu çalışma ile Ömer Seyfettin’in seçme hikâyelerindeki çocuk ve çocukluk unsuru; hikâyelerdeki olay, kurgu, dil ve anlatımın çocuklar üzerinde meydana getireceği olası etkiler incelenerek yazarın çocuk edebiyatındaki yerinin sorgulanması amaçlanmıştır. 100'ü aşkın hikâyesi mevcut olmasına karşın çocukların, yazarı sadece birkaç bilindik hikâyesinden tanıdığı gerçeğinden yola çıkarak kütüphanelerin çocuk kitaplıklarında sıkça görülen on dokuz (19) hikâye, bu kıstaslara göre incelenmiş ve değerlendirilmiştir. Değerlendirmeye alınan öyküler şunlardır: Diyet, Kaşağı, And, Gizli Mâbed, Forsa, Bomba, Kütük, Başını Vermeyen Şehit, Ferman, Pembe İncili Kaftan, Topuz, İlk Cinayet, Yalnız Efe, Perili Köşk, Üç Nasihat, İlk Namaz, Yüksek Ökçeler, İlk Düşen Ak, Falaka. Çalışma nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden doküman incelemesi desenine uygun olarak yürütülmüş, elde edilen bulgular betimsel analizlerle yorumlanmıştır. Yapılan incelemelerde bu hikâyelerden yalnızca 7’sinin (Kaşağı, And, İlk Cinayet, İlk Namaz, Yalnız Efe, İlk Düşen Ak ve Falaka) çocuk ya da çocukluk ile alakalı olduğu, geri kalanlarda herhangi bir çocuk figürü içermediği ya da çocukluk kavramı ile ilgili olmadığı; hatta “Topuz, Başını Vermeyen Şehit, Bomba, Ferman” hikâyelerinde çocuklar bir yana, yetişkinlerin bile okurken ürperecekleri bazı şiddet ve ölüm sahneleri içermesi dolayısıyla çocuk psikolojisi açısından sakıncalı olarak değerlen¬dirilebilecek şiddet unsurlarının yer aldığı görülmüştür. Anahtar Sözcükler: Ömer Seyfettin, çocuk edebiyatı, çocukluk, öykü ve çocuk psikolojisi, hikâye.

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